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SURETY BONDS AS MARITIME CONTRACTS
The Court found passenger vessel surety bonds promising to refund passengers'
money for cruises did not give rise to a maritime lien and thus do not get priority
over other liens.
Effjohn International Cruise Holdings, Inc. v. A&L Sales, Inc.
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
346 F.3d 552
(Decided September 19, 2003)
In December 2000, New Commodore Cruise Lines and its vessel-owning
affiliates filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in the Southern District of Florida. Two of
Commodore's cruise ships, the MIV Enchanted Isle and the MIV Enchanted Capri were
then stranded in the port of New Orleans, Louisiana. They became subject to an
automatic bankruptcy stay, which the Bankruptcy court in Florida lifted to facilitate the
arrest of the vessels. As a result, the district court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
acquired admiralty jurisdiction. Each vessel had copious creditors, some of whom were
asserting maritime liens.
This case resulted from the consolidation of several interlocutory appeals from the
admiralty proceedings arising from the bankruptcy of New Commodore Cruise Lines.
There were two primary issues before the court. First, whether the district court judge
had abused his discretion by denying intervention by two maritime lien claimants upon
one of the two vessels. Second, whether the surety for a passenger vessel surety bond has
a maritime lien.
Plaintiff, Effjohn International Cruise Holdings, Inc. ("Effjohn") sought to assert
domestic maritime claims it had acquired from other creditors via assignment and
subrogation. In late August 2001, Effjohn requested that the bankruptcy court lift the
automatic stay for MIV Enchanted Isle so that Effjohn could arrest the vessel pursuant to
Supplemental Admiralty Rule C of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Effjohn filed a
verified complaint and arrested the vessel. Numerous other creditors intervened. In
October 2001, Effjohn moved unopposed for an interlocutory sale, which was granted
and scheduled for early December. In November, after publishing notice in compliance
with Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Effjohn requested an entry of
default against all non-parties. This order was granted as against "any person, natural or
juridical, who has not already intervened or filed a complaint or claim in this action."
Three days before the scheduled December sale of the MIV Enchanted Isle,
Effjohn sought to amend its complaint to add approximately $500,000 in acquired
subrogated and assigned claims. The district court held a post-sale hearing and afterward
denied the motion as "untimely as a matter of law" and provided the following reasons:
(1) the court found the motion "an ill disguised motion for leave to intervene" because it
asserted claims of parties who had not asserted timely claims; (2) the new claims were
being asserted at a "late date"; (3) the entry of default had been at Effjohn's request; (4) a
second entry of default had been entered December 11th at the request of another party;
(5) the court did not want to permit Effjohn to circumvent the entry of default and
deadline for filing of intervention motions; and (6) if it were not for the failure of Effjohn
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to produce acceptable security after purchasing the vessel at auction the lien-phase of the
action wo11ld be well underway.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's denial of
Effjohn's motion to amend the complaint. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district
court's finding that permitting Effjohn to amend the complaint this late in the
proceedings would be unduly prejudicial to the other parties. Additionally, the Circuit
Court held that lower court was fully justified in denying the motion as a matter of
discretion when considering the default as one factor in the timeliness inquiry.
Cusimano Produce Co. ("Cusimano"), the second claimant of the three combined
interlocutory appeals, is a New Orleans produce company who provided fresh produce to
the MIV Enchanted Isle between October and December 2000. It claims a maritime lien
for necessaries based on the supplied produce, and was not permitted to intervene to
make this claim. Cusimano received personal notice of the bankruptcy in the cases of
Commodore and the Enchanted Capri and timely filed proofs of claim in those
proceedings. It did not receive personal notice involving the MIV Enchanted Isle nor did
it file a proof of claim in that proceeding, and therefore did not receive notice of the
lifting of the bankruptcy stay and the arrest of that vessel.
On February 7, 2002, two months after the sale of the MIV Enchanted Isle,
Cusimano moved to set aside the entry of default and for leave to intervene. The district
court denied the motion, finding that although Cusimano did not receive personal notice
it failed to establish good cause for failing to file a timely claim as the legal notice was
published. The district court also relied on the fact that Cusimano was present in the
other two proceedings and a finding that there would be substantial prejudice to the
timely"-defendants if the default were set aside allowing additional claimants to "straggle
into these proceedings." Therefore, the district court found that Cusimano had received
actual notice and that the equities weighed against setting aside the default judgment
allowing Cusimano's claim. In its appeal, Cusimano maintained this was an abuse of
discretion on the part of the district judge.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that defaults are generally not
favored and should not be strictly enforced. Any doubt should be resolved in the favor of
the moving party in the interest of securing a trial on the merits. Therefore, a court may
set.a�s.Ul.e an ent-ry of default for good cause shown. Showing good cause requires at least
an e�am.inaho.it;
of three factors: (1) whether the failure to act was willful; (2) whether
"'"
setting asid tJii'e default would prejudice the adversary, and (3) whether a meritorious
claim.1111M ��,. presented. These factors, however, are not exclusive and other factors
may be considered. Notwithstanding these principles, the Circuit Court held that
although entries in default are not generally favored, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Cusimano's motion to intervene.
The second issue, whether the surety for a passenger vessel surety bond has a
maritime lien, was raised by Swiss Reinsurance America Corp. and Amwest Surety
Insur,��e €o. ("Sureties"). The Sureties issued a Federal Maritime Commission
Pass�r. �sssel Surety Bond ("bond") to Commodore to cover its vessels, including the
MIV--:-E'nc+hanted Isle and MIV Enchanted Capri. The bond provided security for
passengers who pre-paid for cruises on one of Commodore's vessels but who, through no
fault of their own, never sailed. The bond required the Sureties to refund up to $15
....
million.,··ir�eommodore was unable to do so. A passenger vessel operator is required to
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post such a bond or otherwise prove financial responsibility in accordance with 46 U.S.C.
§ 817e. Swiss Reinsurance America Corp. reinsured the bond and was a co-surety with
Amwest Surety Insurance Co. The Sureties claim a maritime loan for necessaries against
both the vessels in this case based on the bond. In the MIV Enchanted Isle proceedings,
the other parties each moved in January 2002 for summary judgment against the Sureties'
claim contending that the bond was not a maritime contract; that the Sureties did not have
maritime liens against the MIV Enchanted Isle because the bond was not a necessary and
was not provided to a particular vessel; that it was instead issued to Commodore to cover
the entire fleet; and that the Sureties do not have a maritime lien through the vessel's
passengers. Following argument, the district court granted the motions, ruling that the
bond is not a maritime contract; the Sureties do not have a maritime lien for necessaries;
and the Sureties do not have a maritime lien through the passengers because the
passengers do not have maritime liens.
On appeal, the Sureties maintain the claims made in the district court. The court
found that a maritime lien exists for the bond only if the bond is a maritime contract
subject to admiralty jurisdiction and the bond is a necessary provided to a vessel. The
court then determined from case law that the true criterion is the nature and subject
matter of the contract, and whether it was a maritime contract having reference to
matitime service or maritime transactions. The Sureties here urged a broad test for
determining whether a contract is a maritime contract, proposing that where the
underlying contract is maritime and the controversy arises directly out of a claim for non
performance on that contract, an admiralty court has jurisdiction even when money
damages are sought. Under their proposed test the underlying contract for the transport
of passengers would be the maritime contract from which their claim arises.
The Court took a far narrower view relying on Pacific Surety Co. v. Leatham &
Smith Towing and Wrecking Co., 151 F.440 (7th Cir. 1907) and holding that under a
passenger vessel surety bond the Sureties merely agreed to refund passenger monies for
unperformed cruises; it was not a maritime contract and could not give rise to a maritime
lien, as well as distinguishing maritime insurance from surety bonds as the former had
long been a part of world-wide general maritime law covering the risks of navigating a
vessel. While a surety bond is not a well-established part of maritime law, it can only be
drawn upon in the event there is a failure of a vessel to sail at all. The court went on to
find that the bond is a consumer-protection measure, not a maritime service, by making
good on the owner's financial obligations to reimburse passengers for non-performance.
Therefore, surety bonds do not fall within admiralty jurisdiction.
The Sureties argued in the alternative that they had a maritime lien because they
are subrogated to the claims of pre-paid prospective passengers, under the assumption
that such passengers have maritime liens. The Court of Appeals found that such
contracts for prospective passengers were executory contracts that had not as yet been
fully performed, and as such the breach of an executory contract does not create a
maritime lien.
The Sureties then argued that the executory contract doctrine was outdated and
that the court should create a maritime lien in favor of the passengers, using as their only
support the general inclination of Congress toward protecting consumers contracting with
cruise ship operators. The court responded negatively to this notion, finding that the
enactment of 46 U.S.C. § 8 17e demonstrated that there is no maritime lien on pre-paid
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passenger fares because Congress enacted § 817e to provide the passengers with financial
protection without requiring the creation of a maritime lien. Accordingly, the court found
that the Sureties, even to the extent they might be subrogated to such claims, still had no
claims in admiralty.
Therefore, the court upheld the denial of Effjohn's motion to amend its complaint,
the denial of Cusimano's motion to intervene, and the dismissal of the Sureties' claims,
and fully affirmed the ruling of the district court.
Brian Bleich
Class of 2004
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